insisted that they are less serious in the case of justice. The extent of diversity about justice is less -and far more manageable -than diversity about the good. Rawls believed this shared basis was to be found in the basic values of liberal democratic political culture.
Once he recognized reasonable disputes about justice ¾ and thus that his preferred doctrine of "justice as fairness" could be reasonably rejected ¾ Rawls's (2005: xxxvi, xlvi) proposals become much vaguer, focusing on a broad "family" of liberal doctrines. But dispute about the content of shared values, and so the nature of the "family," has emerged (e.g., Tomasi, 2012) . Partly in response to increasing doubts as to whether there is a sufficiently thick moral consensus for Rawls's project to succeed, I (Gaus, 2011: 283-92 ) and others (Vallier, 2014: 103-40; Muldoon, 2016) have proposed what might be called the Diverse Moral Inputs Approach, the so-called convergence theory of public reason. Here, the aim is to see whether, even if diversity of moral reasoning goes all the way to different foundations and commitments, diverse agents can nevertheless endorse the same rules of social morality.
That we start in different places does not mean that we cannot end up on common ground. This approach does not identify a canonical set of reasons that all share, but seeks to understand social dynamics that can lead those who disagree all the way down on moral foundations to nevertheless come to a common endorsement of the moral framework. As Brian Kogelmann (2017) has nicely put it, rather than going far down to find agreement, we look up ¾ to the moral rules that diverse agents can agree upon.
Critics of the Rawlsian Shared Moral Basis Approach have a relatively easy task: they simply query whether the values identified by Rawls ¾ say, the two moral powers ¾ are as widely shared as Rawls claims, or whether they lead to shared rules of justice. So for Moehler to show that his theory helps out when disagreement is too deep for the Shared Basis Approach, he need simply show that some societies do not share the requisite shared beliefs.
On the other hand, showing that moral conflict is too deep for the Diverse Moral Inputs Approach is rather more involved. Rather than simply showing that the minimal basis beliefs (b 1 …b n ) are not shared in some society S, Moehler must argue that in S the forces that lead diverse moral agents to converge on common rules are weaker than the forces that lead them into conflict. Because the Diverse Moral Inputs Approach does not identify the set of agreedupon reasons for direct evaluation of how widely their content is shared, but instead offers an account of the dynamics of convergence, a critic must hold that the gravitational pull towards endorsing the same basic moral rules is overwhelmed by centrifugal forces of diversity. Our moral disagreements, the critic must hold, are stronger than our moral concern with sharing common rules of justice ¾ we rank moral conflict over sharing moral rules and the cooperative order they support.
An Ultraminimal Shared Basis View
Moehler holds that his Minimal Morality could still obtain under these conditions of deep and wide moral conflict. Indeed the very point of Minimal Morality is to provide what we might call a "back-up" morality: a route to moral order when moral diversity undermines the ability of the devices of so-called "traditional morality" to justify moral rules. Focusing on the relation of his analysis to the Diverse Moral Inputs Approach, he is committed to:
The Hobbesian Claim: When the centrifugal forces of moral conflict are too strong to sustain shared rules of justice or social morality, Minimal Morality can provide a basis of minimal moral order by securing peace.
Moehler's defense of the Hobbesian claim is what I shall call an Ultraminimal Shared Basis
Approach. It is, as I see it, an ultra-weak version of a Shared Basis view insofar as, at the end of the day, the account does find a robust shared value from which we can derive the conditions for order: if we go far enough down we find that prudence leads us to the terms of a stable cooperation. Even in cases where the centrifugal forces of moral conflict are too strong to sustain common rules of justice, prudent individuals share deep reasons on which they can erect a minimalist, peaceful, moral order.
I begin, then, with this Ultraminimal Shared Basis: prudence. Moehler writes:
Homo prudens is a forward-looking agent who, despite that she may discount future benefits according to her time preference, values her life together with the expected gains from peaceful long-term cooperation more than noncooperation per se in any particular case of conflict (17). 1
Homo prudens greatly values her life, autonomy and the satisfaction of her basic needs (116) but more than that, conjoined with "the expected gains from peaceful long-term cooperation," her values always favor pursing peace over serious conflict. Moehler is careful to identify a specific type of conflict ¾ conflict in the "strict" sense ¾ which his theory is meant to address: It is characterized by two features (15) (the names are mine):
1 Unless otherwise noted, parenthetical page references refer to Moehler (2018) .
1. The Centrifugal Condition: "the parties to the conflict have tried to resolve their disputes based on the particular moral ideals that they embrace and their implicitly or explicitly agreed moral conventions that may be historically justified or the product of biological, social, or cultural evolutionary processes."
This condition identifies the conflict as one that cannot be resolved by "traditional" morality (such the Diverse Moral Inputs Approach) and so we need a back-up morality: the centrifugal forces of moral disagreement overwhelm the tendency to converge on shared moral rules.
Note, though, that the Centrifugal Condition is open to a weak and a strong interpretation:
1a. The Strong Centrifugal Condition: the parties to the conflict have tried to resolve their disputes based on their particular moral ideals … and their continued moral conflict puts them deeply at odds.
1b. The Weak Centrifugal Condition: the parties to the conflict have tried to resolve their disputes based on their particular moral ideals … and while their moral views provide no help in resolving their conflict, neither do they greatly exacerbate it.
I think the difference between these is important, a point to which I shall return. The second feature specifying the nature of the conflict is:
2. The Conflict Condition: "the parties are so severely negatively affected by the points of contention that they are prepared to engage in destructive actions, including actions that endanger the lives of their conflict partners or those who are close to them, if the disputes remain unresolved, because the agents consider destructive actions to be more beneficial to them than remaining in their current situations" (15).
People are prepared to fight rather than submit to the status quo. This condition too is not quite as straightforward as it may at first appear. The Conflict Condition identifies a general set of "destructive" actions which includes, but is by no means restricted to, acts that endanger lives. Now just what actions are "destructive" (as opposed to honorable or exhilarating) is to some extent internal to a moral view. Hobbes, I think, held that glory seekers may positively value conflict ¾ and this was a general theme of Romantics, such as the "Storm and Stress" movement of eighteenth century Germany. Moreover, individuals will certainly disagree about the specific contexts in which peaceful resolution is better than conflict. Pace the social contract tale, we never simply choose global order or the state of nature, but cooperation here and conflict there. Even during intense civil conflict cooperation on some matters is often maintained. In the American Civil War, from 1862-63, Union and
Confederate armies "paroled" prisoners of war on the condition that they promised not to resume fighting once released (Macpherson, 1988: 791) . We should resist any model that would confront us with a binary choice of all war or all cooperation.
In any event, the core of the homo prudens model is that when the Centrifugal and Conflict conditions are met, purely instrumental Minimal Morality is a rational response. According to Moehler:
The only basis for the justification of a principle of conflict resolution for cases of conflict in the strict sense defined is that agents are rational, they share a similar human nature and empirical environment, and they have an overarching interest in securing peaceful long-term cooperation (17, emphasis added).
Here we have a clear indication that this is an Ultraminimal Shared Basis view: we share this rock-bottom interest in peaceful cooperation. Underlying all our moral conflict is, after all, a basis for Minimal Morality in a shared human nature ¾ homo prudens. Recall again the critical claim: "Homo prudens … values her life together with the expected gains from peaceful longterm cooperation more than noncooperation per se in any particular case of conflict" (17).
What homo prudens would agree to in a suitably described choice situation essentially specifies Minimal Morality.
When Morality Drives Us Apart
Now I think this Hobbesian strategy is plausible for cases described by The Weak Centrifugal Condition. Leaving aside disagreements about when a rule of cooperation is necessary and when it is not, if people are in sustained conflict of non-moral interests that they cannot effectively resolve by appeal to their moral codes or norms, then, for the purposes of social order, they are in a moral vacuum. "Traditional" morality is no help, but neither is it the driver of the conflict. I think it would be plausible to tell a history in which, from the tenth to the sixteenth centuries, many in northern Europe developed moral perspectives that radically loosened the claim of morality over trading and employment, thus allowing tremendous latitude for social organization via self-interested bargains. As Gauthier (1986: chap. 4) observed, the market became something of a morality-free zone. Even here we don't want to follow some of my economist friends and make the mistake of thinking that markets simply substitute prudence for moral regulation: we now have a good body of evidence that without effective moral norms, markets can be grossly dysfunctional (Rose, 2011; Zak, 2008; Friedman, 2008 
How Deep a Conflict?
So my worry is this: Minimal Morality presents itself as a solution to moral conflict that is so deep and divisive that "traditional" moral justification of the rules of cooperation is wellnigh impossible, but it is precisely in such contexts that morally committed individuals are apt to reject homo prudens as a model for conflict resolution. Think of England in 1640, France in 1789, America in 1861 or contemporary Islamic societies split between Shia and Sunni, or India between Hindus and Muslims. And the list goes on and on. To different degrees, on moral, ideological or religious grounds, large groups act resolutely non-prudentially: they are willing to set back their interests and incur deeply impaired social cooperation and risk various levels of violence in the name of fidelity to moral or transcendental ideals. In these cases, I do not see how effective social cooperation can be grounded on prudential morality.
A familiar stylized history of the growth of liberal toleration ¾ from a modus vivendi to liberal justice ¾ seems to support a prudence-first analysis. As the tale goes, after the wars of religion, the parties were exhausted and agreed to call off the conflict for purely prudential reasons. Eventually this self-interested settlement evolved into a moral consensus on liberal toleration. There is certainly some truth in this tale: people can come to conclude that their moral battles are simply more destructive than they are worth. Yet, I reckon this was a far more complex process than this simple narrative supposes. 
A Congruence Problem for Minimal Morality
A morality based on the value of peace and prudence confronts the mirror-image of Rawls's congruence problem. In Theory (1999: 496-99) Rawls derived principles of justice from our common commitments, but then worried whether the demands of justice might be overridden by a person's reasons emanating from self-interest or, more generally, their conception of the good. Thus he sought to show congruence between the right and the good.
In parts of the Political Liberalism project this led to the claim that the principles of justice were not fully justified until they were justified by each person's entire conception of the good (Gaus and Van Schoelandt, 2017) . Now Minimal Morality's problem is basically the opposite: 
Is One's Morality a Bargaining Chip?
It is important to stress that homo prudens is not necessarily self-interested. "The homo prudens model," Moehler tells us, "considers all types of interest that agents may have, independent of their motivation and content" (102). So suppose we take all of a person's concerns ¾ and this certainly can include her ideals and religious commitments ¾ and devise a preference ordering. What is important is that this ordering is constrained by the homo prudens assumptions: people value peace over conflict, and demand that their autonomy is respected and basic needs met.
Moehler describes all these values and commitments that underlie a person's utility function as her "interests," so (speaking roughly now) maximizing utility just means that she maximizes the satisfaction of her cardinally represented interests. Once prudent individuals are represented by such well-formed utility functions, the stage is set for Moehler to employ a version of the Nash bargaining solution. This is an influential proposal today; Ryan Muldoon (2016: 79-80) employs the Nash bargaining solution in a related way. Many hold the Nash solution to provide a unique, rational, bargain between morally diverse individuals.
As much as I respect Michael and Ryan, I remain unconvinced that this particular formal solution enlightens us about our moral disputes.
My worry is that the prudential individual's utility function is based not simply on things that we might rationally haggle over ¾ say our respective shares of a common product ¾ but about our moral commitments. If we do not keep in mind that some of the "preferential"
differences represent disagreements about morality and justice, it may seem when Alf and
Betty have a moral conflict we can usefully model this in the same way as a problem about dividing a resource (see Gaus, 2018a) . Suppose Alf believes that God instructs that living with the heterodox endangers the salvation of all, while Betty advocates toleration on Lockean grounds. The question is this: can either Alf or Betty accept the idea that the moral resolution of this dispute is defined by the stabilized Nash bargaining solution? "Come on Alf," she says, "be reasonable and meet me half-way: let's say we shall have toleration except for Catholics and ¾ to concede something to you ¾ we shall also exclude Methodists." Could Alf really think it would be unreasonable for him to resist this, in the same way as it would be unreasonable for him to insist, say, on all the cake they have just made? James II essentially offered toleration for Dissenters if they would endorse tolerance for Catholics ¾ it was an offer they found reprehensible and a violation of their religious convictions. I am not saying that parties might not, at some point, end up in some sort of pragmatic compromise, but I cannot see that they would see the compromise as any sort of a morality. Once everything is turned into an "interest" it is too easy to conflate the sort of haggling consistent with moral commitment and that which is not. If we are apt to come to blows over conflicts of our cherished ideals, instructing us to be prudent and bargain does not look reasonable.
Reconciliation v. Splitting the Difference
I am an enthusiastic advocate of moral reconciliation on matters basic to social cooperation ¾ of each finding, within his moral view, the resources to live on moral terms with others even if they are not the terms that he sees as morally best. But, like Rawls's overlapping consensus, this must be a task for each moral view to work out on its own, as it seeks to live with others on moral terms. No bargaining theory is going to give a universal answer: John Nash, alas, did not discover a single rational recipe for moral reconciliation. There is no recipe, simply because one dimension of moral conflict is the importance of reconciliation (Gaus, 2018a) . As I noted at the outset, this is a feature of the Diverse Moral Inputs Approach that frustrates many philosophers: there is no canonical derivation or decision method that gives the unique answer. It is always a matter of each moral agent, in light of her and others' moral views, sometimes adjusting her moral demands, seeking partners in moral relations, gravitating to different moral rules in different contexts, and forming moral orders as they do so. This is a moral theory of dynamics, not statics: we look for ways of relating that facilitate maximal reconciliation, not generate recipes for it.
Are Prudence and Rational Choice Really Fundamental?
So, I'm afraid that after wrestling with Hobbesian-inspired theory for most of my career, I
remain unconvinced that, for all its elegance and sophistication, Hobbesian-inspired rational choice theory tells us much about the how to live in morally divided societies. I wish it did, for I would love to have on call on a minimal, back-up, theory, which could assure us that there is almost always some specific rational morality on which we can draw. Moehler's analysis, is in the end a hopeful one. As long as we are prudent, there is at least a Minimal Morality for us: if we go far down enough, below our moral disputes, we share a commitment to prudential reason. Perhaps my fundamental disagreement with Hobbesian analysis is that, on my reading of human evolution and cognition, moral structure and rules come before social order by rational choice (Gaus, 2018b (Gaus, , 2018c . We are not rational creatures who invented social morality: we are social creatures who hit upon morality, which then allowed us room to further structure social life through mutual advantage. As Joseph Henrich (2016: 51-53) observes, strategic reason is only useful given a set of shared norms: it is neither prior to them, nor can it replace them. When we truly have no shared "traditional" morality to guide us, I cannot see much possibility of fruitful and reasonably stable social cooperation.
